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Abstract: This paper analyses the emissions and cost impacts of mitigation of non-CO2 greenhouse
gases (GHGs) at a global level, in scenarios aimed at meeting a range of long-term temperature
goals (LTTGs). The study combines an integrated assessment model (TIAM-Grantham) representing
CO2 emissions (and their mitigation) from the fossil fuel combustion and industrial sectors, coupled
with a model covering non-CO2 emissions (GAINS), using the latest global warming potentials from
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report. We illustrate that in
general non-CO2 mitigation measures are less costly than CO2 mitigation measures, with the majority
of their abatement potential achievable at US2005$100/tCO2e or less throughout the 21st century
(compared to a marginal CO2 mitigation cost which is already greater than this by 2030 in the most
stringent mitigation scenario). As a result, the total cumulative discounted cost over the period
2010–2100 (at a 5% discount rate) of limiting global average temperature change to 2.5 ◦C by 2100 is
$48 trillion (about 1.6% of cumulative discounted GDP over the period 2010–2100) if only CO2 from
the fossil fuel and industrial sectors is targeted, whereas the cost falls to $17 trillion (0.6% of GDP) by
including non-CO2 GHG mitigation in the portfolio of options—a cost reduction of about 65%. The
criticality of non-CO2 mitigation recommends further research, given its relatively less well-explored
nature when compared to CO2 mitigation.
Keywords: non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs); climate change mitigation; long-term temperature
goals (LTTGs)
1. Introduction
Achieving stringent mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is likely to require a multi-gas
approach. As such, it is important to understand the contribution of non-CO2 mitigation to achieving
different long-term temperature goals. This requires simulations of future energy, industrial and
agricultural systems to account for all GHGs together, in as consistent a manner as possible. This paper
presents a multi-model approach to such a challenge, to analyse the emissions and cost impacts of
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mitigation of both CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs at a global level, in scenarios which are focused on meeting
a range of long-term temperature goals (LTTGs). The objectives are threefold:
• First, to demonstrate how an integrated assessment model (TIAM-Grantham) representing CO2
emissions (and their mitigation) from the energy and industrial sectors is coupled with a model
covering non-CO2 emissions (GAINS) in order to provide a complete picture of GHG emissions in
a reference scenario in which there is no mitigation of either CO2 or non-CO2 gases, as well as in
scenarios in which both CO2 and non-CO2 gases are mitigated in order to achieve different LTTGs.
• Second, to demonstrate the degree of indirect mitigation of non-CO2 gases that results from
mitigation of CO2 sources. This principally applies to methane (CH4) emission reductions which
result from reduced extraction and distribution of fossil fuels in CO2 mitigation scenarios which
see a shift from fossil fuel energy sources to renewables and nuclear.
• Third, to analyse the costs associated with mitigating non-CO2 GHGs to varying degrees,
by considering different levels of CO2e prices applied to the non-CO2 GHG-emitting sectors,
relative to the CO2 prices that result from the CO2 mitigation scenarios. This provides a picture of
the marginal impact (in terms of temperature change in 2100) of varying the relative degree of
effort in mitigating non-CO2 gases when compared to CO2 mitigation effort.
Non-CO2 GHG emissions, at about 14 GtCO2e in 2010 (compared to 37 for CO2 emissions)
constituted about 28% of total GHG emissions in that year, measured on a CO2-equivalent (CO2e) basis
using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth assessment report 100-year global
warming potentials (GWP100) with climate-carbon feedback effects for each gas [1,2]. Agricultural
CH4 and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions, at between 5.2 and 5.8 GtCO2e in 2010, are the largest
contributor to non-CO2 GHG emissions. Over the last three decades (comparing 1980–1989, 1990–1999
and 2000–2009) CH4 and N2O emissions from agriculture increased from about 4 to over 5 GtCO2e
per year, with CH4 emissions from livestock (enteric fermentation, mainly from cattle) accounting for
just under half of this level throughout this period. Emissions growth from most agricultural sources
(enteric fermentation, manure and fertiliser) in Africa, Asia and the Americas has been offset to some
extent by emissions reductions in Europe [3], but future demand for food from these regions could be a
major driver of emissions growth over the coming decades. Waste, fossil fuel extraction, transmission
and distribution, and industrial production are other significant sources of non-CO2 GHGs, principally
CH4 and N2O.
As well as making a significant contribution to warming of the climate, some non-CO2 species
also lead to relatively large amounts of warming per tonne emitted. CH4 for example, by mass, has a
global warming potential over 100 years (GWP100) which is 34 times larger than that of CO2 when
taking account of carbon-climate feedback effects in the atmosphere [1]. It is important to note that this
value is higher than the value (25) used in the previous (fourth) IPCC assessment report [4], when such
feedbacks had not been adequately considered. This comparative measure of warming—that of an
equivalent mass of CO2—is the basis for emissions accounting and allows one method of comparing the
cost effectiveness of mitigation measures across different gas species for a given timeframe. The major
sources and mitigation options for non-CO2 GHGs are shown in Appendix A.
In addition to the technical supply side measures shown in Appendix A, mitigation could also
come through changes in consumer preferences for meat and dairy products and reduced losses
and waste of food [3,5,6] although there is in general less evidence on these demand-side emissions
mitigation options [3].
There have been relatively fewer studies on the mitigation potential of non-CO2 GHGs compared
to CO2 from the energy and industrial sectors. A number of sector specific studies were carried
out in the late 1990s and early 2000s [7–9], many of which formed the basis of more comprehensive
assessments [10–12]. These studies were undertaken in order to construct marginal abatement cost
curves for 2010, which were then extrapolated for use in integrated assessment studies [13,14]. Further
work [15] extended the marginal abatement costs (MACs) more systematically to 2100. This analysis,
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as well as some more recent analyses [16], has formed the basis of relatively recent estimates of
long-term mitigation in for example the agricultural sector [17].
A consistent message from the multi-gas modelling studies is that the cost of mitigation to achieve
a given temperature goal is less when mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs is included amongst the mitigation
options available. For example, Rao and Riahi [13] found that carbon prices associated with achieving
a radiative forcing level of 4.5 W/m2 by 2100 when using a multi-gas mitigation approach are about
half those when using a CO2-only set of mitigation measures. Kurosawa [18] found that a multi-gas
approach (again, to achieve a 4.5 W/m2 forcing level by 2100) leads to a global mitigation cost of
3.8% of GDP by 2100, compared to 8.6% of GDP with a CO2-only approach. Lucas et al. [15] found
that a multi-gas approach lowers mitigation costs between 3%–21% (by 2050) and 4%–26% (by 2100)
compared to a CO2–only approach, to achieve a 550 ppm CO2e stabilisation concentration of GHGs.
Recent analysis [19] shows that non-CO2 mitigation to higher CO2e prices can relax the cumulative
CO2 budget required to meet specific temperature targets, which could be a useful facet of flexibility if
there are specific technology constraints which prevent the achievement of stringent CO2 budgets.
This analysis is the first of which we are aware that examines the impact of non-CO2 gases on
overall mitigation costs when using the latest GWP100 figures produced by the IPCC [1]. In addition,
this study, unlike the more recent studies on non-CO2 gases [20,21], explicitly sets out the relative
contribution of non-CO2 gases to 2100 warming when taking into account differences between the
marginal mitigation cost of CO2 and non-CO2. This is of particular policy relevance when considering
the acceptable level of marginal mitigation effort that might be allocated to different gases. Although
the “what, when and where” flexibility of mitigation advocated by Stern [22] suggests that the
most cost-efficient mitigation strategies should see CO2e prices equilibrate between sectors, gases
and regions, it is clearly not going to be possible in all practical cases to achieve this. A further
policy-relevant aspect of this analysis is that—in light of the Paris Agreement’s [23] goal to achieve
global warming levels of “well below 2 ◦C”—it is instructive to consider the degree to which this might
be achieved without a contraction of an already-challenging CO2 budget, but rather with additional
effort in the non-CO2 emitting sectors. In examining scenarios in which there is greater mitigation effort
in the non-CO2 emitting sectors than the CO2 emitting sectors, this analysis allows a consideration of
the potential viability of such strategies.
2. Materials and Methods
The model used in this assessment, the Greenhouse Gas Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies
(GAINS) model, has a comprehensive, multi-country and region representation of non-CO2 GHG
emissions sources, as well as the measures and costs for their mitigation [24,25]. The cost data
used here is from the 2013 update of the GAINS model. It has been used in recent studies of the
mitigation potential of CH4 [26], as well as other climate forcing species such as black carbon, with a
view to assessing not just climate but also air quality, health and agricultural crop yield benefits of
mitigating these short-lived species [27]. As such, it has been chosen because of its relatively recent
development, its state-of-the-art level of detail of mitigation options for the non-CO2 GHGs, as well as
its geographical detail which allows aggregation of countries into regions which closely match the
15 regions represented in Imperial College London’s global TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM
System) Integrated Assessment Model (TIAM-Grantham) [28,29]. This model represents the global
energy and industrial system in these regions, including low-carbon technologies and their costs,
and associated CO2 emissions. It is an inter-temporal optimisation model which finds the welfare
maximising solution to the objective of meeting future energy service and industrial product demands
across all economic sectors within a given climate or CO2 emissions constraint. It has been used in a
model inter-comparison study as part of the AVOID 2 research programme to analyse the technologies
and costs of a range of long-term temperature targets [30]. It should be noted that this analysis covers
the well-mixed GHGs and does not explicitly model emissions of aerosols and precursors, for example
black carbon—for each scenario these have been estimated using the methods described below.
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There are in many cases interactions between measures that mitigate different GHGs. For example,
mitigation of CO2 frequently consists of substituting non-fossil energy sources for fossil fuels, which
results in reduced fugitive CH4 emissions from the extraction and distribution of these fuels [21].
In addition to accounting for such interactions, it is important to ensure a high level of consistency
between the drivers of energy and industrial CO2 emissions and those for non-CO2 emissions sources,
principally agricultural activity responsible for CH4 and N2O emissions.
In order to maximise consistency between the energy and industrial CO2 mitigation modelling in
the TIAM-Grantham model, and the non-CO2 mitigation modelling in the GAINS model, a number of
steps have been undertaken, as described in detail in Appendix B. In summary:
• For each LTTG (in this study 2100 temperature change levels of 2, 2.5 and 4 ◦C are assessed) a
cumulative 2000–2100 global CO2 budget for the fossil fuel and industrial (FFI) sectors has been
estimated from a simple interpolation of the budget from the Representative Concentration
Pathways (RCPs) and projections of their corresponding global temperature change when
simulated with a probabilistic version of the Model for Greenhouse gas Induced Climate Change
(MAGICC) (as detailed in [31]) using a distribution of equilibrium climate sensitivity from the
Fifth Coupled Model inter-comparison Project (CMIP5), as detailed in [32];
• The TIAM-Grantham model has been used to produce an unmitigated reference scenario, as
well as mitigation scenarios based on these estimated CO2 budgets, using a standard set of
socio-economic drivers, specifically the OECD variant of the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways 2
(SSP2), which has been used in order to represent a future world in which recent socio-economic
trends continue [33];
• The GAINS model, also using SSP2 socio-economic inputs, as well as energy price and fossil
fuel supply and demand outputs from the TIAM-Grantham model scenarios, has been used to
produce a “baseline” level of non-CO2 emissions for each TIAM-Grantham scenario, as well as
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for each ten-year time point (2020, 2030, 2040, etc.) for each
non-CO2 GHG species (Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Fluorinated gases (F-gases, which
are perfluorocarbons, PFCs, Sulphur hexafluoride, SF6, and hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs));
• For each scenario, the 2100 temperature when mitigating non-CO2 GHGs to different prices
(on a GWP100 basis, with prices relative to the CO2 price for each TIAM-Grantham scenario) has
been calculated, using the same version of the MAGICC used to estimate the initial CO2 budgets;
• Where the non-CO2 and CO2 prices are equal, if there is a major (in this case, greater than 0.1 ◦C)
difference in the calculated 2100 temperature change relative to the initially-intended LTTG,
a revision to the initial CO2 budget has been made and the process repeated.
As indicated above, the MAC curves derived from GAINS allow analysis of non-CO2 mitigation
up to a CO2e price equal to the CO2 price which was output from the TIAM-Grantham model
(thereby equating marginal mitigation “effort” for CO2 and the non-CO2 GHGs) as well as at CO2e
prices at different fractions of the TIAM-Grantham CO2 price (thereby considering different marginal
effort levels for non-CO2 GHGs when compared to CO2 mitigation effort). This approach allows
analysis of the 2100 median temperature change and overall mitigation cost (i.e., considering both CO2
and non-CO2 mitigation options) when considering lower and higher levels of “effort” of non-CO2
GHG mitigation measures compared to CO2 mitigation measures. For each mitigation scenario, as well
as the 2100 temperature change, the cumulative discounted cost (using a discount rate of 5% per year) of
both CO2 and non-CO2 GHG mitigation is calculated, relative to the reference (unmitigated) scenario.
3. Results
3.1. Mitigation of Non-CO2 Emissions
Figure 1 shows the emissions level for each GHG in the unmitigated reference scenario where
there is no price or constraint on any of the GHGs, using the GWP100 equivalence measure (as taken
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from the IPCC’s fifth assessment report [1]). This unmitigated scenario follows from running the
TIAM-Grantham model to produce a scenario for a least-cost energy system that meets future
energy needs under the SSP2 shared socio-economic pathways assumptions [33], but with no climate
constraints. Emissions rise from 50 GtCO2e/year in 2010 to 132 GtCO2e/year in 2100. The resulting
median warming in 2100 is 4.6 ◦C. For both 2100 emissions and temperature change, these figures
are closer to the upper end of the range for the high emissions scenarios presented in the IPCC’s 5th
Assessment Report, WGIII [2], reflecting the relatively strong socio-economic growth throughout the
century represented by the SSP2 input scenarios. It can be seen that CO2 is the largest contributor
to GHG emissions throughout the period (reaching 93 GtCO2e/year by 2100), with CH4 and N2O
continuing to remain significant. By comparison, the RCP8.5 pathway, which has the highest emissions
of the RCPs, sees global GHG emissions reaching 120 GtCO2e/year in 2100, albeit with much lower
global GDP by 2100 (a seven-fold increase over the 21st century [34], compared to an 11-fold increase in
this study). Of this 120 GtCO2e/year, approximately 80 GtCO2e/year is from CO2 and the remainder
from non-CO2 gases (compared to 93 and 39 GtCO2e/year respectively in this study) [35].
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Figure 1. Global greenhouse gas emissions in the (unmitigated) reference scenario. Notes: The
approximately linear nature of the e GHG emissions levels is primarily because o the approximately
linear nature of the CO2 emissions level, which is coincidental only. Emissions values follow from
detailed modelling of the energy and non-CO2 GHG emitting sectors in 10 year time-steps from the
TIAM-Grantham and GAINS models used in this analysis. As shown in Appendix C which decomposes
the CO2 emissions levels, the emissions pathway results from non-linearly increasing GDP, offset
by non-linearly decreasing primary energy intensity of GDP, combined with approximately constant
CO2 intensity of primary energy.
Henc , both RCP 8.5 and this study se non-CO2 emissions accounting for about a third of the total
GHG emissions by 2100, slightly higher than the upper end of the range (16–27%) in recent multi-gas
mitigation scenarios [20]. In fact in these recent scenarios the maximum 2100 non-CO2 emissions level
(across the six models compared) is 30 GtCO2e/year, with CH4 emissions at 15 GtCO2e/year. This is
about 10 GtCO2e/y ar below the emissions in this study, mainly because in th s study CH4 makes
up 25 GtCO2e/year in 2100. This results from three main factors: first, the relatively high-growth
socio-economic assumptions driving future emissions growth in this study; second, the considerably
higher GWP100 value for CH4 (34) taken from the IPCC’s latest (i.e., fifth) assessment report compared
to the lower valu (25) used in th recent multi-gas mitigation scenarios [20] and also he IPCC’s
earlier fourth assessment report [1], and third, the considerably higher CH4 emissions from global oil
production in GAINS’ historical emission inventories compared with others (e.g., [20,35,36]), which is a
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result of a more in-depth estimation method [37] and which also has implications for future emissions
from this source.
Table 1 shows the estimated CO2 budgets as well as the median temperature change that results
from mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs to a CO2e price (using GWP100) equal to the CO2 price from the
TIAM-Grantham model for each budget (taking the scenarios with delayed action to 2020). Also shown
is the median 2100 temperature change resulting from the unmitigated TIAM-Grantham and GAINS
scenarios (i.e., resulting from the emissions levels shown in Figure 1).
Table 1. Estimates of 2000–2100 cumulative CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industry sectors, with
associated calculated 2100 median temperature change.
Scenario CO2 Cumulative BudgetEstimate (2000–2100), GtCO2
Subsequent Calculation of
2100 Median Temperature
Change in MAGICC, ◦C
Baseline No budget constraint—results incumulative CO2 of 6000 GtCO2
4.62
2 ◦C with delayed action to 2020 1340 2.00
2.5 ◦C with delayed action to 2020 2260 2.45
4 ◦C with delayed action to 2020 5280 3.88
Figure 2 shows the non-CO2 GHG emissions for a 2 ◦C mitigation scenario with global mitigation
action starting in 2020 (and weak country/regional policy actions to 2020), after CO2 mitigation has
occurred to meet the cumulative CO2 budget, but before any specific mitigation has occurred in the
non-CO2 sectors. Also shown is the completely unmitigated level of non-CO2 GHG emissions that
derive from the reference scenario with no mitigation action for any GHGs (which in the case of
non-CO2 means action beyond that prescribed in existing legislation as of September 2015). In other
words, Figure 2 shows the indirect mitigation of the non-CO2 GHGs that occurs as a result of changes
in the energy system when transitioning to low-carbon (and in particular lower fossil fuel reliance)
over the century. There is significant mitigation of CH4 (about 9 GtCO2e/year by 2100) resulting
from reduced fossil fuel extraction and distribution, and therefore lower fugitive CH4 emissions. The
importance of accounting for this indirect mitigation effect has been highlighted in recent studies [21].
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Figure 3 shows the effect of indirect mitigation for a range of long-term temperature goals. As
expected, the degree of mitigation increases as the temperature goal decreases, resulting from an
increasingly marked shift from a fossil fuel-based energy system to a low-carbon system in which
non-fossil sources such as nuclear and renewables dominate.
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mitigation action delayed to 2020. Notes: Percentage figures show the share of fossil fuels in total
primary energy supply in 2010 and 2100 for each scenario.
Figure 4 sh s the further mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs resulting from mitigation measures
target d pecifically towards these gases, for the 2 ◦C sc nario with delayed action to 2020. Also
shown are the levels of each non-CO2 GHG for t e indirectly mitigated case. The figure s ows for
each time step the mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs up to the CO2e price that is equal to the CO2 price
in the TIAM-Grantham model (i.e., the shadow price of CO2 associated with achieving the least cost
mitigation pathway to meet the specified 21st century cumulative CO2 budget). As such, this equates
a level of mitigation effort for CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs according to the marginal cost of abatement at
any given time. In the case of Figure 4, this marginal abatement cost is calculated on a GWP100 basis.
It can be seen that there is significant abatement of all non-CO2 GHGs up to this CO2e price, such
that by 2100 fully itigated level of non-CO2 GHGs is just under 13 GtCO2e/year, compared to
39 GtCO2e/ye r in the unmitigated refere ce scenario. Of the 27 GtCO2e/year reduction, 69% occurs
through the direct mitigation of the non-CO2 GHGs and 31% through the indirect mitigation (mostly of
CH4) that follows from CO2 mitigation. Of the unmitigated reference 2100 level of each non-CO2
GHG, 67% of CH4, 37% of N2O and 99% of F-gases are mitigated, leaving 7.8, 4.5 and 0.1 GtCO2e/year
of CH4, N2O and F-gases respectively. These reductions compare to recent modelled scenarios
(focusing specifically on the issue of non-CO2 GHG mitigation) in which by 2100 up to 71% of CH4,
42% of N2O and 90% of F-gases are mitigated [20], as well as the broader IPCC fifth assessment report
database [38] in which, across all f the most stringent mitigati n sce arios, 44–74% of CH4, 9–42%
of N2O and 45–90% of F-gases are mitigated by 2100, compared to the relevant unmitigated baseline
scenario for each m del u ed. In this , the range of 2100 CH4 emi sions is 12–25 GtCO2e/year
(using the most current CH4 GWP100 value of 34) in the reference scenario and 4–11 GtCO2e/year
in the mitigation scenarios, compared to 25 GtCO2e/year and 7.8 GtCO2e/year in the 2 ◦C scenario
of this study. The database’s range of 2100 N2O emissions is 3.0–8.8 GtCO2e/year in the reference
and 2.1–8.1 GtCO2e/year in the mitigation scenarios, compared to 7.0 and 4.5 GtCO2e/year in this
Energies 2017, 10, 602 8 of 23
study. The database’s range of 2100 F-gases emissions is 1.2–10 GtCO2e/year in the reference and
0.06–1.7 GtCO2e/year in the mitigation scenarios, compared to 7.2 and 0.08 GtCO2e/year in this study.
Hence, the reference and mitigation emissions levels in this study are within the AR5 database
range, although the CH4 reference emissions are at the higher end of the range, reflecting the
relatively high socio-economic growth path and industrial output growth over the 21st century,
as previously mentioned.
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Figure 5 sho s the ti e-dependent global arginal abate ent cost curves for the total non-CO2
G Gs starting fro the point at hich any indirect itigation occurring as a result of CO2 itigation
has already occurred, for the 2 ◦C scenario in which global mitigation action starts in 2020. Of note
is that, even in 2100, there is expected to be significant abate ent potential at arginal costs of
$50/tCO2e or less, ith the ajority of abate ent in all years available at below $100/tCO2e. The
increase in itigation potential bet een 2050 and 2100 is entirely driven by changes in activity levels,
e.g., population, econo ic gro th and changes in the energy-syste . o effects of learning or
technological develop ent are taken into account in the assess ents of future itigation potentials.
A reason is that there is a lack of e pirical basis for adopting general assu ptions about the rate at
which non-CO2 regulations would drive long-ter technological develop ent. ost likely, this drive
is not as strong for non-CO2 as for CO2, here regulations reinforce already existing incentives to
i prove energy efficiency in order to save on energy costs. ence, in the absence of a fir basis for
assu ptions on technological develop ent of non-CO2 itigation easures, the esti ated future
potentials for non-CO2 itigation should be considered conservative rather than opti istic.
Also of note is the presence of so e significantly negative cost itigation easures in all years.
These easures are not profitable with today’s energy prices, but expected to become profitable in the
future, conditional on a rise in future energy prices. This effect is not accounted for in the reference
scenario as it is defined as a scenario without further mitigation actions. Whether measures that become
profitable in the future as a result of rising energy prices will be taken up automatically or not depends
on more factors than pure short-run cost-effectiveness [39]. Without additional regulations in place, the
presence of x-inefficiency, institutional inertia and uncertainty regarding future regulations and energy
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prices, are likely to discourage investments in mitigation in the reference scenario. To avoid speculation,
such investment opportunities appear here as negative cost mitigation measures in the cost curves and
are likely to be among the first measures to be taken up once regulations have been introduced.Energies 2017, 10, 602 9 of 24 
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Figure 5. Time-dependent global marginal abatement cost curves for the total non-CO2 GHGs
(GWP100 basis) for 2 ◦C scenario with global mitigation action starting in 2020, relative to the case
where indirect non-CO2 GHG mitigation resulting from CO2 mitigation has already occurred. Notes:
Measures with a negative marginal abatement cost are assumed to be cost-saving if adopted. They are
not assumed to be taken up in h reference scenario, as a result of uncertainty, inertia and inefficiency
in current practices.
Figure 6 shows the marginal abatement cost curves for 2050, for three different LTTGs (2, 2.5
and 4 ◦C median global warming by 2100), in scenarios with global mitigation action starting in 2020.
At higher LTTGs, th re is less indirect mitigation, wh ch means that the total direct mitigation potential
at a given CO2 price is greater.
Table 2 sets out some significant mitigation options for each non-CO2 GHG within different
cost ranges.
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Figure 6. Global marginal abatement cost curves in 2050 for the total non-CO2 GHGs (GWP100 basis)
for different LTTGs, relative to the case where indirect non-CO2 GHG mitigation resulting from CO2
mitigation has already occurred. Notes: Measures with a negative marginal abatement cost are assumed
to be cost-saving if adopted. They are not assumed to be taken up in the reference scenario, as a result
of uncertainty, inertia and inefficiency in current practices.
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Table 2. Major non-CO2 GHG mitigation measures in different cost ranges.
Non-CO2 GHG ≤$0/tCO2e <$50/tCO2e <$100/tCO2e >$100/tCO2e
CH4
• Increased recycling and energy recovery of
biodegradable solid waste instead
of landfill;
• Farm-scale anaerobic digestion on large
pig farms;
• Recovery and use of associated waste gas
from gas production;
• Reduced leakage from gas transmission
pipelines in Russia and Eastern Europe
• Oxidation of ventilation air methane from
underground coal mines;
• Pre-mine degasification of coal mines;
• Recovery and use of currently vented
associated waste gas from oil production;
• Reduced leakage from oil and
gas production;
• Dietary feed changes for
indoor-fed livestock;
• Intermittent aeration of rice fields
• Waste optimisation;
• Replacing cast iron gas
distribution networks
• More expensive gas leakage
reduction measures;
• More expensive waste
reduction options
N2O
• Best Available Technology in nitric
acid production;
• Reduced and regulated use of N2O in
anaesthetics and propellants;
• Optimise domestic wastewater treatment
• Catalytic reduction of N2O in nitric
acid production;





• Replace N2O in anaesthetics
PFCs - Replace PFCs with NF3 insemiconductor industry -
Inert anodes in primary aluminium
production
SF6
Leakage control of SF6 in mid-high
voltage switches - - -
HFCs End-of-life recollection of HFCs indomestic refrigeration
• Replace HFCs with low-GWP alternatives
and HFOs in air conditioning, refrigeration
and heat pumps;
• Leakage control in air conditioning
and refrigeration;
• Replace HFCs with Fluoro Ketone
(i.e., FI-5-1-12) in fire extinguishers
Replace HFCs with CO2 in
refrigeration in industry
and transport
Replace HFCs with CO2 in ground
source heat pumps, air conditioning
and commercial refrigeration
Notes: All CO2e prices calculated using GWP100 basis; many mitigation options span a range of costs, depending on region, practices and local costs—hence figures are illustrative and do
not reflect all details of estimated cost curves.
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Figure 7 shows, for the different scenarios explored, the total cumulative discounted cost over
the period 2010–2100 (at a discount rate of 5%) associated with mitigation of CO2 to 2100, as well
as mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs to 2100 at a range of CO2e prices, the latter as a percentage of the
CO2 price from the TIAM-Grantham model for each time point. This cost is calculated by combining
two costs: the first is the present value (using a discount rate of 5%) of the additional cost of the
energy system in the TIAM-Grantham model when comparing the 2 ◦C scenario with the unmitigated
reference scenario; the second is the present value (again at a discount rate of 5%) of the sum of annual
non-CO2 mitigation costs as calculated from the area under the marginal abatement cost curve for
each year in the GAINS model. Mitigation at a zero price on non-CO2 (thereby allowing only negative
cost measures) results in a 2100 median temperature change of just under 2.5 ◦C. This is because the
cumulative CO2 budget for the fossil fuel and industrial sectors in order to produce a 2100 median
warming level of 2 ◦C is appropriate only if there is also significant abatement of non-CO2 GHGs [40]
(broadly in line with the level of mitigation achieved in the RCP 2.6 scenario [41]).
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Figure 7. Cost of meeting 2100 temperature change levels with n - 2 HG mitigation at a range of
CO2e prices relative to CO2 mitigation, for the 2 ◦C scenario with delayed action to 2020. Notes: Figures
in parenthesis on Y-axis show costs as a share of cumulative 2000–2100 discounted GDP (at 5% per year
discount rate); blue points on chart are for non-CO2 GHG prices which vary over time (as a fixed
fraction of CO2 prices) whereas red points show time-invariant non-CO2 GHG prices.
Mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs even to a small fraction (20%) of the price of CO2 from fossil fuels
and industry leads t significant abatement of non-CO2 GHGs, an a 2100 median temperature change
of much closer to 2 ◦C (about 2.04 ◦C), at an additional cumulative discounted cost of around 0.08% of
2010–2100 GDP. Even at this 20% fraction of the fossil fuel and industry CO2 price, the non-CO2 GHG
price rises to $1170/tCO2e by 2100. For this reason Figure 7 also shows the median warming (as well as
total mitigation cost) at sustained prices of (2005) $50/tCO2e and $100/tCO2e throughout the century,
reflecting the significant degree of mitigation potential available up to these prices, as shown in Figure 5.
As expected, the scenarios with these CO2e prices lead to median warming levels which are lower
than th 2.5 ◦C median warming that results when a zero CO2e price is applied to non-CO2 GHGs.
However, the scen rios with a uniformly-applied CO2e price are not as cost-efficient as the
scenarios in which the CO2e price is applied as a fixed fraction of the (rising) CO2 price, which is to
say that they do not achieve as low a level of 2100 median warming at the same cumulative cost as the
fractional price scenarios. For example, Figure 7 shows that applying a CO2e price of 20% of the CO2
price throughout the mitigation period (during which the CO2e price rises from $0/tCO2e in 2020 to
$38/tCO2e in 2030, $62/tCO2e in 2040 and then to $1170/tCO2e in 2100) is actually less costly, and
achieves a lower 2100 temperature change, than applying a $50/tCO2e price uniformly from 2020 to
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2100. This is because, with the uniform non-CO2e prices, some of the mitigation effort in the early part
of the century which targets short-lived CH4 and F-gases (particularly over the decades 2020–2040,
in which the uniformly applied CO2e price is on average higher than the steadily-rising fractional
CO2e price) has no impact on the 2100 median warming level, and is in some ways therefore “wasted”
effort (and cost) with regard to the 2100 median temperature change. This additional mitigation cost of
the uniform non-CO2e price, which does not achieve a benefit in terms of 2100 warming, outweighs
the (discounted) cost saving of the uniform price being lower than the fractional price in later decades.
This result is, however, highly dependent on the discount rate used (with lower discount rates
de-emphasising the cost of applying a uniform price in the short term, compared to the higher fractional
cost in the long term). Perhaps more importantly, it is feasible that early action on mitigation of non-CO2
gases would reap benefits in terms of learning and associated cost reductions in future mitigation
measures. In addition, early mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs may be seen as highly advantageous in order
to lower near-term warming, regardless of its impact on warming in 2100. Hence, further analysis is
required before any policy conclusions can be drawn on the timing and degree of effort in mitigating
short-lived gases such as CH4.
Also of note from Figure 7 is that where the non-CO2e price is higher than the CO2 price
(the “120%” point) there is relatively little impact on 2100 median temperature change, since the
vast majority of non-CO2 abatement is already taken up at lower non-CO2e prices.
A similar analysis is shown for the 2.5 and 4 ◦C scenarios, in Figures 8 and 9 respectively. Of note
is that the overall mitigation cost is significantly lower than the 2 ◦C pathway, which gives a sense of
the relative degree of challenge involved in meeting the 2 ◦C long-term goal. In fact, in the case of the
4 ◦C scenario, the very low mitigation costs for CO2 are slightly outweighed by negative cost measures
for non-CO2 gases, leading to an overall marginal negative cost of meeting the 4 ◦C goal. Whether this
is realisable in practice depends on the realism of achieving these measures. These stem principally
from recycling in developing countries, with the assumption that recycled products would be sold at
international market prices—in practice the recycled products may have less economic value than this
if they cannot reach these markets.
In both the 2.5 and 4 ◦C scenarios, there is actually over-achievement of the long-term goal
(i.e., temperature change is less than 2.5 and 4 ◦C respectively) when the CO2 and non-CO2 prices are
equal, indicating that the target may be achieved in a less costly way with a little less CO2 mitigation
effort. Nevertheless, the final estimated median temperature changes are sufficiently close to the
desired goals to prove useful as an indicative scenario of the costs and measures associated with
meeting these goals.
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Figure 8. Cost of meeting 2100 temperature change levels on-CO2 GHG mitigation at a range of
CO2e prices relative to CO2 mitigation, 2.5 ◦C scenario with delayed action to 2020. Notes: Figures in
parenthesis on Y-axis show costs as a share of cumulative 2000–2100 discounted GDP (at 5% per year
discount rate).
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Figure 9. Cost of meeting 2100 temperature change levels with non-CO2 GHG mitigation at a
range of CO2e prices relative to CO2 mitigation, 4 ◦C scenario with elayed action to 2020. Notes:
Figures in parenthesis on Y-axis show costs as a share of total cumulative 2000–2100 discounted GDP
(at 5% per year discount rate).
Figure 10 shows a subsection of the data from Figures 7–9, so as to demonstrate the change in total
mitigation cost an median 2100 t mperature change as th n n-CO2 GHG price (in $/tCO2e using
GWP100) changes as a fraction of the CO2 price (in $/tCO2). This demonstrates first the significant
additional cost of meeting the 2 ◦C target compared to the 2.5 and 4 ◦C targets, as well as the significant
reduction in 2100 temperature change achievable by including non-CO2 GHG options in the overall
mitigation portfolio. This is most clearly illustrated with reference to the vertical dashed line around
the 2.5 ◦C mark in Figure 10: this LTTG is achievable eit er at a cost of $48 trillion by focusing
only on CO2 mitigation, or alterna ively at $17 trillion by including non-CO2 GHG mitigation in the
portfolio of options, a cost reduction of about 65%. This compares to the figures discussed in Section 2,
in which Rao and Riahi [13] found an approximate halving of carbon price, Kurosawa [18] found an
approximate 55% cost saving by 2100, and Lucas et al [15] found a 4–26% mitigation cost reduction
by 2100, when achieving a 550 ppm CO2e stabilisation concentration using a multi-gas approach
compared to a CO2-only approach. The gre ter percentage cost savings in this study a most likely
to stem from the fact that the scenarios shown i Figure 10 are for global mitigation action starting
from 2020, whereas the above-quoted cases are immediate action scenarios. As such, this makes it
more challenging and costly to meet any given long-term target with CO2 alone as a result of lock-in
to CO2-intensive infrastructure and technologies with delayed action, thereby increasing the benefit of
including non-CO2 GHG mitigation.
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Figure 10. Costs of achieving different long-term temperature goals with varying degrees of non-CO2
mitigation (in terms of CO2e prices as a fraction of CO2 prices).
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4. Discussion
The 21st century cumulative CO2 budgets estimated for the 2 ◦C, 2.5 ◦C and 4 ◦C long-term
temperature goals achieve 2100 median temperature changes of 2.00, 2.45 and 3.88 ◦C, once mitigation
of non-CO2 GHGs is taken into account up to a CO2e price equal to the CO2 price in the fossil fuel
combustion and industrial process sectors.
Significant mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs, particularly CH4, results from the transition from a
fossil fuel intensive to low-carbon energy and industrial system. This is primarily because fugitive
CH4 emissions from oil, coal and gas extraction, transmission and distribution activities decline
with total primary fossil fuel demand. Further, significant mitigation of the majority of non-CO2
GHGs is available at relatively low CO2e prices, with the majority of options below $100/t CO2e
(when calculated on a GWP100 basis). This means that the mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs even to
CO2e prices at a fraction of the fossil fuel and industrial CO2 price yields significant reductions in
2100 median temperature change. The most cost-effective non-CO2 mitigation options include:
• For CH4, increased recycling and energy recovery of biodegradable solid waste instead of landfill,
reduced leakage from gas pipelines in Russia and Eastern Europe, extended recovery of associated
waste gas from gas and oil production, and farm-scale anaerobic digestion of manure on large
pig farms;
• For N2O, reduced emissions from nitric acid production through improved technologies and
catalytic reduction, as well as optimised wastewater treatment practices and improved fertiliser
application regimes in agriculture;
• For F-gases, reduction of leakage of HFCs from refrigeration, as well as replacement of HFCs with
low-GWP alternatives in refrigeration and air conditioning.
The total cumulative discounted cost over the period 2010–2100 (at a 5% discount rate) of limiting
global average temperature change to 2.5 ◦C by 2100 is $48 trillion (about 1.6% of cumulative discounted
GDP over the period 2010–2100) if only CO2 from the fossil fuel and industrial sectors is targeted,
whereas the cost falls to $17 trillion (0.6% of GDP) by including non-CO2 GHG mitigation in the
portfolio of options—a cost reduction of about 65%.
If non-CO2 GHGs are mitigated to the same CO2e price level as for CO2 from the fossil fuel and
industrial emissions sectors, then there is significant abatement of all non-CO2 GHGs up to this CO2e
price, such that in the 2 ◦C scenario, by 2100 the fully mitigated level of non-CO2 GHGs is just under 13
GtCO2e, compared to more than 39 GtCO2e in the unmitigated reference scenario. Of this approximate
27 GtCO2e reduction, 69% occurs through the direct mitigation of the non-CO2 GHGs and 31% through
the indirect mitigation (mostly of CH4) that follows from CO2 mitigation. For each non-CO2 GHG
(CH4, N2O, and aggregated F-gases) the absolute emissions in the reference and mitigation scenarios
are within the ranges of the database of scenarios presented in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report,
although the CH4 reference emissions are at the higher end of the range, reflecting the relatively high
socio-economic growth path and industrial output growth over the 21st century that underlies the
scenario projections in this study. Furthermore, the percentage emissions reductions of each non-CO2
GHG resulting from both direct and indirect mitigation are also comparable to those in the fifth
assessment report database.
For the most stringent mitigation scenario explored in this study (that aimed at achieving a 2 ◦C
median temperature change in 2100), mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs beyond the CO2 carbon price does
not yield significant reductions in 2100 temperature. This is because the marginal abatement cost curve
for non-CO2 GHGs is relatively steep at higher CO2e prices, so that little marginal mitigation happens
as CO2e prices increase. This indicates that mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement’s “well below
2 ◦C” goal is likely to have to come through a contraction of the 21st century CO2 cumulative budget
(relative to the budget which achieves the 2 ◦C goal), rather than through increased action on non-CO2
GHGs alone.
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The analysis also indicates that a rising CO2e price could result in a more cost-efficient mitigation
strategy than a constant CO2e price over time, where earlier action on short-lived gases such as CH4
does not contribute to a significant impact on 2100 temperature change. Three factors must be accounted
for in further considering this point: (i) the discount rate used and the value of early mitigation costs
compared to later mitigation costs; (ii) the fact that early action on CH4 mitigation could foster learning
and cost reductions, making later mitigation cheaper, and (iii) the fact that short-term mitigation of CH4
may be an important facet of avoiding any dangerous overshoots of temperature change.
Although the mitigation potentials and costs in the GAINS model take account of purely technical
barriers to adoption on a regional basis, there are other barriers which are more difficult to account for
e.g., behavioural or institutional. Such barriers may add to costs at the local level. On the other hand,
the purely technical nature of the cost estimates also means not accounting for potential co-benefits of
mitigation in terms of improved health and reduced agricultural damages from methane as an ozone
precursor [27]. In addition, a number of mitigation options associated with demand-side measures,
notably human dietary changes, are not included. These could yield significant additional non-CO2
emissions reductions [17,42]. Finally, the analysis does not assume technological development and
associated cost reductions in the non-CO2 mitigation measures over time. Implementation of climate
policies, which incentivise the wide-spread adoption of non-CO2 abatement technology, are likely to drive
the development of cheaper and more effective abatement technology as time and learning progress.
In summary, a number of major policy implications derive from this analysis. First, indirect
mitigation of non-CO2 gases from CO2 mitigation strategies is significant, which reaffirms the policy
imperative to focus on shifting from fossil-fuel intensive to low-carbon technologies. Second, direct
mitigation of non-CO2 gases is potentially very cost-effective as part of an overall mitigation strategy,
with cost savings in the 2.5 ◦C scenario shown in this study even greater than those for similar scenarios
in previous studies, owing to the increased difficulty of achieving this mitigation goal through CO2
mitigation alone, as a result of significant global mitigation action starting from 2020 only. Each of
the major cost-effective non-CO2 GHG mitigation measures highlighted should therefore be fully
incentivized through appropriate policy measures. Third, the steepness of the marginal abatement
cost curve for non-CO2 GHGs after relatively low-cost abatement (at typically below $100/tCO2e)
has been taken up implies that increasingly stringent long-term temperature goals, such as the Paris
Agreement’s 1.5 ◦C aspiration, are likely to rely in a large part from further mitigation of CO2. However,
an important caveat is that this study does not include demand side changes such as dietary changes,
which could yield further cost-effective mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs. A fourth implication for policy
makers is that it will be critical to weigh up the relative costs of early mitigation of short-lived non-CO2
GHGs, which may not yield benefits in terms of longer-term warming (assuming they are eventually
mitigated) but which could drive cost reductions in non-CO2 mitigation technologies and measures
through learning, whilst achieving important near-term reductions in warming.
This analysis, combined with the fact that non-CO2 GHG mitigation options, particularly on the
demand side, remain relatively less well explored compared to CO2 options, highlights the importance
in undertaking further research into the drivers, barriers and costs of mitigating these gases, so that
policy makers can understand the trade-offs between early, gradual and delayed adoption of non-CO2
mitigation measures.
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Appendix A. Source and Mitigation Options for non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases
Table A1. Source and mitigation options for non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
Non-CO2 Gas % of Total GHG Emissions in 2010 Major Sources Mitigation Options for Each Major Source
Methane (CH4)
GWP100: 34 (Reference [1],
Table 8.7, p 714)
20%
Livestock (enteric fermentation and manure
management)
Anaerobic digestion of manure with biogas capture and utilization;
Animal diet changes
Rice cultivation Field water management




Source separation, recycling and treatment of biodegradable waste instead of landfill;
Extending wastewater treatment from primary to secondary/tertiary
Fugitive emissions from coal, oil and gas extraction,
transmission and distribution
Reduced venting of associated waste gas from oil and gas production;
Leakage control at oil and gas wells and from gas transmission and distribution networks;
Pre-mining degasification of coal mines;
Ventilation air methane oxidation on underground coal mine shafts
Nitrous oxide (N2O)
GWP100: 298 (Reference [1],
Table 8.7, p 714)
6%
Agricultural soils Improved N use efficiency;Precision nitrogen application
Combustion stationary sources Modified fluidized bed combustion





GWP100: as presented in
Reference [1],
Supplementary material,
Table 8.SM.16, p 8SM-24.
2%
Perfluorocarbons (CF4 and C2F6) from primary
aluminium production;
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from semiconductor industry
Conversion to point-feeder prebake technology;
Retrofit of aluminium plants with new anode materials;
Replace PFCs with NF3 in semiconductor industry
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) from insulation for medium
and high voltage switchgear Good practice leak control and SF6 recycling
SF6 from magnesium casting Replacement with SO2










Replacing HFC with low-GWP alternatives;
Leakage control;
Recovery/Recycling;
Ban on use of HFCs;
Incineration of HFC-23 emissions from HCFC-22 production
Sources: Share of historical emissions pre-2005 for each gas from [2]; Major emissions sources pre-2005 from [5,13,43]; Emission sources post-2005 from [26,44–46]; Mitigation options as
implemented in the GAINS model from [26,44–47].
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Appendix B. Deriving Temperature Goal-Consistent 21st Century CO2 Budgets and
Emissions Profiles
The TIAM-Grantham [28–30] and IIASA GAINS [24,25] models are used to derive time profiles of
emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O and total F-Gas emissions from a given cumulative CO2 budget for fossil
fuels and industry (FFI) in order to meet a given long-term temperature goal (LTTG)—the temperature
change in 2100. In order to make climate projections (verifying the CO2 budgets) the total F-Gas
emissions must be broken down into constituent species and emissions of other gases must also be
estimated. The process of constructing the full set of emissions required and the iterative process used
to determine the 21st century (i.e., 2000–2100) CO2 FFI budget is detailed here. A schematic of the
information flow through the RCPs, TIAM-Grantham, GAINS and Met Office Hadley Centre (MOHC)
calculations is illustrated in Figure A1.
1. Projections of global temperature change for the four RCPs is made using emissions relating
to the RCPs [48]. Emissions are used rather than concentrations as this takes fuller account of
uncertainty carbon cycle feedbacks. Following Bernie and Lowe [49], probabilistic projections are
made using values of equilibrium climate sensitivity from models in the fifth Coupled Model
Inter-comparison Project (CMIP5) [50] along with uncertainty distributions of ocean mixing and
carbon cycle feedbacks.
2. In each year land use emissions of CO2 are linearly interpolated from the RCPs on the basis of
each RCP’s median 2100 projected temperature and the intended LTTG of the scenario.
3. Initial estimates of 21st century cumulative CO2 emissions from the FFI sectors are also
linearly interpolated from the RCPs on the basis of future temperature projections and the
new scenario’s LTTG.
4. The cumulative CO2 FFI budget thus derived from the RCP projections is then used to calculate
emissions of CO2 from FFI, CH4, N2O and F-gases:
a. time profile of CO2 emissions from FFI is then calculated from the cumulative CO2 FFI
along with a carbon price profile;
b. The CO2 FFI emissions profile and aspects of the underlying energy system structure
(in particular the fossil fuel energy mix) are then passed to GAINS to calculate non-CO2
GHG no-mitigation scenarios and corresponding MAC curves;
c. The CO2 FFI profile from TIAM-Grantham and the non-CO2 GHG no-mitigation scenarios
and MAC curves from GAINS are then used to calculate the emissions of CH4, N2O and
total F-Gas emissions, at different levels of CO2e price applied to the non-CO2 GHGs
(using GWP100 values).
5. Individual F-gas emissions are then needed, but the constituent F-gases in the categories used
by GAINS do not exactly match those used by MAGICC. Whilst this has a very small influence
on the overall CO2e emissions, the individual gas species are needed by MAGICC. To estimate
emissions of individual F-gases it is assumed that the relative emissions rate of each F-gas to
the total F-gas emissions will change with time in line with the “unmitigated” RCP 8.5 scenario.
Based on this assumption the emissions of each F-gas in RCP 8.5 are scaled by a ratio of the total
F-gas emissions from GAINS to the total F-gas emissions in the unmitigated reference scenario.
So for example if the F-gas emissions from GAINS are 20% of the unmitigated F-gas emissions for
that scenario, then this factor is applied to emissions of each individual F-gas from RCP 8.5. This
approach circumvents the issue of different gases being included in the calculation by GAINS
and those needed by MAGICC. While other assumptions are possible, given the relatively small
effect of differences in F-gas emissions between the RCPs, this is an appropriate level of detail for
the scope of the current study.
6. The emissions of non-Kyoto GHG and other gases needed by MAGICC (principally NOx, CO,
NMVOC, SO2) are all based on the ratio of the emissions of each gas to the emissions of CO2 from
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the FFI sector in the RCPs being applied to the CO2 FFI emissions from TIAM-Grantham. For
example if the CO2 FFI emissions from GAINS in a given year where 80% of the way between RCP
4.5 and RCP 6.0, the SO2 emissions would be the product of the CO2 FFI from TIAM-Grantham
multiplied by a weighted mean of the ratio of SO2 to CO2 FFI in those two RCPs, with four times
more weight given to the ratio from RCP 6.0.
7. Projected median 2100 temperature change is then calculated and if within 0.1 ◦C of the original
LTTG, the CO2 FFI budget is accepted, or else the CO2 budget for the scenario is re-estimated,
before repeating the above procedure to re-calculate 2100 median temperature change.
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It should be noted again that the temperatures resulting from the emissions derived from a given
budget are verified as eeting the target. ith the cu ulative CO2 FFI being the only variable here
the process used in iterating its value for each target warming level is unimportant. However, the use
of a si ple interpolation of cu ulative CO2 e issions to deter ine eventual war ing is a notion
that has become widely accepted in recent years [51–53]. Its use here to initially estimate the CO2
budget for specific target warming levels implicitly assumes that the contribution of non-CO2 gases
to warming is linearly related to the emissions of CO2. While this may appear to be broadly the
case across the wide range of scenarios from the IPCC’s AR5 WGIII report [54], the wide spread in
IAM construction and the experimental design across the scenarios available is likely to obscure more
subtle relations from IAM scenarios constructed under specific sets of assumptions on constraints. For
example two scenarios with similar CO2 emissions profiles but which focus on either energy demand
reduction or the heavy use of bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) would likely have
different non-CO2 contributions to warming. Similarly, emissions scenarios with different climate
targets derived from a common approach, such as here, would not necessarily produce a robustly
linear relation of warming to CO2 when the nuances of the underlying technological, economic and
social assumptions and constraints are considered.
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While the breakdown of the relation of cumulative emissions to temperature demonstrated by the
need for iteration in developing these scenarios in small, it illustrates the inherent uncertainty in this
relation and warrants careful verification of projections developed on this basis.
Appendix C. Decomposition of CO2 Emissions in (Unmitigated) Reference Scenario
Figure A2 shows the emissions levels of each GHG in the reference scenario as shown in Figure 1,
indexed to its 2010 value. This figure demonstrates that only CO2 emissions increase approximately
linearly over the period 2010–2100.
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Figure A3 shows the changes in each of the three factors on the right-hand side of Equation (A1).
The Figure shows that whereas GDP increases non-linearly to 2100, primary energy intensity of GDP
decreases (again non-linearly) over this period. CO2 intensity of primary energy remains approximately
constant over the period to 2100, as a result of the fossil fuel share of primary energy remaining at just
over 80% throughout the century. The approximately linearly increasing nature of CO2 emissions is
therefore a purely coincidental result of non-linear changes in two of the three underlying components.
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